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I examine taziff policy in an oligopoly trade model where an importing country
with no domestic production of its own, imports a good [rom more than one foreign
exporter with asymmetric costs. Under plausible assumptions, aa long as marginal
cost is not too concave, a larger tariff is imposed on the low cost firm in order to
induce more competitive behavior.
'CentER for Economic Research, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tílburg, The Netherlands.1 Introduction
The literature on tariff policies has only examined tariffs in the context where the import-
ing country imposes a tariff on a single foreign producer or where the importing country
imposes a uniform tarifl across all foreign producers. Thie ignores the possibility that
when there is more than one foreign producer, the importing country can manipulate
the strategic situation between the foreign producers by levying a different tariff on each
producing country.
A brief summary of the literature on tariff policy and imperfect competition includes
work by Brander and Spencer [l, 2, 3], de Meza [4], Katrak [5], and Svedberg [6]. For
models with a foreign monopolist and linear demand, Katrak [5] and Svedberg (6j showed
that optimal policy for the importing country is to impose a tariff. Brander and Spencer
[2, 3] and de Meza [4] showed that for more general demand functions, import tariffs
are optimal as long as demand is not too convex. Brander and Spencer [1] extended
this analysis to the case when the foreign producer competes with a domestic producer.
Finally, Brander and Spencer [3] examined optimal policy when the foreign industry
is oligopolistic and Lhe importing country imposes a uniform tariff across all exporting
countries. They found again that positive tariffs are optimal as long as demand is not
too convex.
I extend the Brander and Spencer [3] oligopoly analysis to the case when costs are
asymmetric and the importing country can impose a different tariff on each foreign
producer. For the most plausible case, as long as marginal cost is not too concave,
the importing country imposes a larger tariff on the firm with the cost advantage. In
addition, the requirement for positive tariffs is the similar to the one derived by Brander
and Spencer.
2 The Model
The setting is similar to the one Brander and Spencer [3] use to examine rent extraction
from a Cournot oligopoly. There are three countries, the home country and two foreign
exporting countries. Each exporting country has a firm which produces and sells the2
product in the home country. The firms have different costs. In the first stage of
the game, the home country chooses its import poGcy. In the second stage, each firm
simultaneously chooses its output. I examine the subgame perfect equilibrium of this
game.
Profits for each firm are:
~` - (p(Q) -T~)9 - c~(9) (1)
Where firm i's output is q', total output is Q- ~; q' and i's cost of producing q' units of
output is c'(q'). The inverse demand function is p(.) and the tariff imposed on country i
is T'. I restrict cost asymmetries to the case when marginal costs differ only by a constant
(i.e. c'(q') - c(ql) t kq' and c2(q~) - c(q~)). Assume that p is twice differentiable and
c is three times differentiable.
Following standard practice, I use total surplus as the measure of home welfare. Home
r.onntry w~~lfarc (W) is thus t6~~ sum of c~onsumer surplus (CS) and tari(f rr,vcnui:v (R').
W-CSf~R' (2)
where tariff revenue from each country i is R' - T'q' and net consumer surplus is
CS - jó p(Q)dQ - p(Q)Q when total output is Q.
3 The Cournot Equilibrium
I first solve [or the Cournot equilibrium given tariffs. Firms maximize their profits
through choice of outputs. Each firm's first and second order conditions for profit max-
imization are:
xi - p(Q) - T' - c'(q') - k f 91P(Q) - 0 (3)
xii - 2P(Q) - ~~(91) f 91p~(Q) G fi (4)
Az - p(Q) - T2 - c'(9~) f 9~P(Q) - 0 (5)
A~s - 2P(Q) -~~(9~) f q~P~(Q) G fi (6)
The following standard assumptions are made: rr;~ - p'(Q)fq'p"(Q) G 0 and rr;; G A,~,
where ~r;; and n;~ are the second partials of firm i's profit with respect to i and j's output,3
i~ j. The first is the common assumption ofstrategic substitutes and the second requires
that each firm's own output has a greater effect on ita marginal profit than the rival's
output. The second assumption implies that D- a~~AZZ-a1zazl ~ 0 which is a sufficient
condition for the uniqueness of the static Cournot equilibrium.
It is a simple matter to examine the effect of a change in the tariff on countty 1
holding the tariff on country 2 constant. Totally differentiating the first order conditions
(3) and (5) with dTZ - dk - 0 yields:
xiidq' f ~izd92 - dT' - 0 (7)
Aiid41 f Azad92 - 0 (8)
I solve (7) and (8) for qT, - dq1~dT' and qT, - dq~~dTl. Similarly, one can examine the
effect of a change in T~ while holding Tl constant. This yields the following comparative
static results:
~





QT, - D G 0





Firm i's output is strictly increasing in i's taziff while decreasing in j's tariff. Total output
is strictly decreasing in either tariff and price is increasing. From these comparative
statics, it can be scrn that a tariff on firm i lowers consumer surplus, increases the profit
o[ firm j and dccrcascs the profit of firm i. '1'hrough similar calculations I show that
9k - qT~~ 9k - 9T~ and Qk - QT~.
4 Tariffs and Rent Extraction
I now solve the importing country's problem. The importing country maximizes welfare
through its choice of tariffs to be imposed on each exporting country. The first order
condition with respect to each tariff is:
WT~ --QPT~ f 9' f T'9T~ f T'q'T, - 0 (13)4
The first term is negative and represents the negative effect of an increase in i's tariff
on consume~r surplus. The sum of the second two terms is positive when T' - 0 and
represents the e(fect of an increase in the tariff on tariff revenues from firm i. The sign
of the last term is indeterminate (it is positive if T' 1 0 and negative if T' G 0). It
represents the effect of an increase in country i's tariff on tariff revenues from country j.
I assume that the second order conditions are satiafied and that the equilibrium tariffs
are unique.
Now use the first order conditions to solve for TI and T~ as implicit functiona of Tl,
T~, and k.
7,t - (q'T~9' - ~T,9~) f (QT`~T, - QT~~T~)QP'
(14)
qT~~T, - qT,~Tc
First consider when there is no cost asymmetry, k- 0. With no cost asymmetry, the
equilibrium tariffs and outputs are equal (Tr - T~ - T' and q~ - q~ - q'). F,quation
(14) now simplifies to:
~ - (q'T. - q'r,)(q' - QPT.) (15)
qT'yT~ - qT~yT'
The term q'T; - q~T, is positive by assumption and since in a symmetric equilibrium,
q' - Q~2, the condition for a positive tariff is pT. G 1~2. That is, price should increase
at less than half the rate at which one of the tariffs increases. Simplifying the expression
for pr. (12) yields:
1 (16)
PT.-3fR-~'IP'
where R - Qp"~p' is Brander and Spencer's measure of the relative curvature of the
demand curve. The demand function is concave if R~ 0 and convex if R C 0. Thus, as
in Brander and Spencer, for a given cost function c, the optimal tariff is positive if the
demand function is not too convex. With constant marginal costs, T' ~ 0 if R 1-1. ln
general, T' ~ 0 whenever R 1 -(1 - c"~p').
Now consider asymmetric costs. Since the equilibrium tariffs are continuous, if R is
such that the symmetric tariff is positive, then the asymmetric tariffs are also positive
as long as the cost difference, k, is not too large. Hence for small cost asymmetries, the
eyuilibriurn condition for positive tariffs is again that demand should not be too convex.
As with earlier studies of tariff policy using linear demand functions, the optimal tariffs5
are always positive. For example, with demand (p - a- 6Q) and conatant marginal cost
(c normalized to zero), tariffs and outputs are T' -(2a - 3k)~8, T~ -(2a -~ k)~8,
q' -(2a - 3k)~8b and q' -(2a -~ k)~86. Both tariffs are positive for any k for whicó the
high cost firm still producea.
5 Manipulation of Competition
Now, to examine how asymmetric costs affect the relative size of tariffs, subtract T' from
T~ (14) to get the following expression:
T~ - T' - (P - ~~(q'))q' - (P - ~~(q'))q' (17)
Differentiating this expression with respect to k yields:
d(T~ - T')




- ~(Y - c"(9~)) } (P~
-
~„(9~))q~ - P~q~~ dk~
w}~ere
(18)
t 2 dq" - ; dT ; dT ;
(Ík
- qT~ dk } 9T'~ ~k } qk
In general, it is not possible to determine the sign of dT'~dk or dT~~dk and hence the
sign of dq"~dk is indeterminate. However, by considering two possible cases, some results
are possible.
First consider the case when dq''~dk - dq'~~dk G 0. This includes the moat plausible
outcome where an increase in the cost of the high cost firm results in a decrease in the
high cost firm's output and an increase in the low cost firm's output (dq''~dk G 0 and
dq''~dk ~ 0).
When costs are symmetric (k - 0), (18) simplifies to:
d(T dk T ~) - ~(P - c"(9~)) - d~~(9)9~ (ddk' - ddk~)
(19)
By supposition, the second term oí the right hand side is negative. The term p'-c"(q`) G
0 by assumption and hence as long as c"'(q') is not too negative, d(T2 - T')~dk ~ 0.
'l'hat is, when Lhe cosL di(ference is small and marginal cost is not too concave, T~ ~ T~.s
For example, with linear demand and constant marginal costs, dq'l~dk C 0, dq'~~dk ~ 0
and T~ ~ T' for small cost differences. If fact, in this example, the taziff for the low cost
producer is always greater than that for the high cost pmducer (Tt -(2a - 3k)~8 and
T' - (2a f k)~8).
When marginal cost is not too concave, the impotting country has two incentives fot
imposing a larger tariff on the low cost firm. First, the low cost firm can absorb a higher
tariff and hence an increase iu the low cost firm's tariff will, in moat cases, reduce output
by less than an increase in Lhe high cost firm's tariff. That is a tariff on the low cost firm
harms coiisumer surplus less than a tariff on the high cost firm. Second, distinct taziffs
on each firm manipulates the competitive situation between firms. A larger tariff on the
firrn with the cost advantage, serves to reduce the cost advantage, fostering more intense
competition between the two firms. Since firms compete more vigotously, tariffs are less
costly in terms of consumer surplus. The second effect can be most easily seen in To [7]
where the model is such that only the difference in tariffs is significant and hence there
is no revenue eflect. Tariffs serve only to manipulate the competitive situation between
firms.
The converse is that when marginal cost is sufficiently concave and the cost difference
is small, T~ C T'. When margínal cost is very concave, there are increasing returns to
scale. In this case, rather than intensify competition, the importing country prefers to
manipulate competition in the other direction and reduce competition. This encourages
production by the low cost firm which reduces its marginal cost.
The other case is when dq''~dk-dqi2~dk ~ 0. Using the same argument, when costs
are symmetric, (19) is negative as long as marginal cost is not too concave. In this case,
T~ c T' when k is not too large. This case requires that one or both of the following
hold: dq''~dk 1 0 or dq'~~dk G 0. Although it cannot be ruled out, it seems rather
implausible.7
6 Bertrand Competition
For illustrative purposes, I provide a simple example oí Bertrand competition. Demand
is assumed to be linear, q' - a- 6p' f dp~ where i, j- 1, 2 and i~ j. In order to simplify
computations, d is expnxsscd as a acalar multiple of 6, d- a6, a C 1. Margiual cc~sts to
be constant with the low cost firm's marginal coet normalized to zero.
The equilibrium prices given the taziffs are:
pl - a(2 f~) ~ 6(2k f 2T' f aT')
(20)
b(4 - a~)
p~ - a(2 ~- a) t b(ak ~ aT' f 2T~)
(21
b(4 - a~) )
Substituting these prices into total surplus and then maximize to get the optimal tariffs:
7,1 - a(3 ~ 2a) - bk(3 - 2a~)
b(9 - 4az)
(22)
7,z - a(3 -I- 2a) f- bka
(23)
6(9 - 4a~)
Substituting this back into the equilibrium price and then output, I get:
q~ - a(3 i- 21) - bk(3 - 2a')
9-4a
z (24)
2 a(3 -~ 2a) f bka
q - 9 - 4a2
(25)
As with the Cournot example with linear demands, both tariffs are positive as long as
both firms produce. Furthermore, by examining the difference in the tariffs, T~ - T' -
k(3 -F a- 2az)~(9 - 4~~), it can be seen that a larger tariff is imposed on the low cost
firm. With these linear demand examples, both Bertrand and Cournot yield very similar
results.ti
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